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Are Men More Likely than Women To Commit Scientific Misconduct?
Maybe, Maybe Not
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ABSTRACT In their study published in January 2013 in mBio, Fang et al. reviewed records from the Office of Research Integrity
(ORI) and found more cases of scientific misconduct committed by men than women, particularly by faculty (F. C. Fang, J. W.
Bennett, and A. Casadevall, mBio 4:1–3, 2013). Powerful social norms shape the way men and women behave, and implicit gen-
der schemas can lead to different evaluation standards for men and women for tasks stereotypically linked to one gender. It is
possible that norms for acceptable male and female behavior could lead to a lower threshold for men than women to engage in
the risky behavior of scientific misconduct. It is also possible that women and men commit scientific fraud at the same rate but
that, because crime is a male-gendered domain, evaluators require more proof of the criminal “competence” of women for an
investigation to rise to the level of an ORI case or that female gender norms for likeability and a lower apology threshold more
often prevent escalation of women’s fraud beyond a local level. Male scientists also have more opportunity to commit fraud than
female scientists because they receive more NIH research funding—a finding that may also be influenced by gender schemas. We
cannot conclude from the ORI data that men are more likely than women to risk the consequences of committing scientific mis-
conduct simply because risk taking aligns with male gender stereotypes. Neither can we conclude that because men are more
likely than women to commit fraud in other contexts, men are also more likely than women to commit scientific fraud. We can
conclude, however, that scientific misconduct, regardless of who commits it, diminishes all who contribute to the scientific en-
terprise.
In their January 2013 study, Fang et al. reviewed almost 20 yearsof cases of scientific misconduct reported by the U.S. Office of
Research Integrity (ORI) (1). The 228 individuals who had com-
mitted misconduct included scientists of all ranks and types. Fang
et al. further found that 65% of those who committed misconduct
were male and that of the 72 faculty members who committed
misconduct, 88% were male. Powerful social norms shape the
behavior of men and women. These norms support the possibility
that men are more likely than women to commit fraud in the
scientific arena, but they also support a willingness to assume that
men are more likely to commit scientific fraud in the face of in-
complete data.
Being willing to take risks is more strongly associated with the
male gender, while being timid is more strongly associated with
the female gender (2, 3). It is possible that lifelong reinforcement
of these scripts of acceptable male and female behavior, or sche-
mas (4), could lower the bar for men to engage in the risky behav-
ior of scientific misconduct. After all, according to the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, men are about 6 times more likely than
women to be arrested for almost all crimes (5).
It is also possible that men and women are equivalent in actu-
ally engaging in scientific misconduct but that, as acknowledged
by Fang et al., men are more likely to be detected. This would be
predicted from the operation of gender schemas affecting evalua-
tive judgments in stereotype congruent activities. When one gen-
der is overrepresented in any role, it leads to an assumption that
the activity requires traits stereotypically associated with that gen-
der (6). For example, men are overrepresented in leadership in
nearly all domains. The male gender schema includes being inde-
pendent and directive, which has led to the assumption that effec-
tive leadership requires these behaviors (7, 8) in spite of experi-
mental and field evidence to the contrary (9, 10). Most criminals
are men, making criminal activity a male-gendered activity and
leading to the implicit assumption that stereotypically male qual-
ities are required to commit a crime. When assessing the ability of
a woman to perform a task stereotypically associated with males,
evaluators consistently require more proof to confirm her compe-
tence than they do for a man being evaluated for the same task
(11). Extrapolating this body of research to scientific misconduct,
one would predict that it requires more evidence to conclude that
a female scientist was “competent” at committing fraud than a
male scientist. Fang et al. admit that they do not know how many
cases were investigated by ORI, but the gender distribution of this
group might be revealing, although, even if men are overrepre-
sented in the cases investigated by ORI, the requirement for higher
evidentiary proof of fraud for female scientists might have filtered
out more women than men before reaching the level of an ORI
investigation. Social norms also lead women to apologize more
often than men (12) and to the assumption that women are more
likeable than men (13, 14). Apology alone can prevent legal action
in some situations (15), and greater likeability might prevent es-
calation of scientific errors to the level of an investigation (16–18).
When presented with partial or ambiguous information, hu-
mans fill in cognitive gaps with knowledge from assumptions that
may be based on implicit group stereotypes (4, 19). To conclude
from the data of Fang et al. that men are more likely than women
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to commit scientific fraud relies on these same cognitive biases
because we do not have enough data to support this conclusion.
We cannot conclude that, simply because risk taking aligns with
male gender stereotypes, men are more likely to risk the conse-
quences of committing scientific misconduct. Neither can we con-
clude that, because men are more likely than women to commit
fraud in other contexts, men are also more likely than women to
commit scientific fraud. It is possible that men are overrepre-
sented among ORI scientific misconduct cases, but there are too
many assumptions we need to make with the data presented by
Fang et al. to reach this conclusion— even if these conclusions
comfortably align with cultural stereotypes. The numbers are
small, and more certainty with respect to the percentages of males
and females in the pool of potential perpetrators is needed. The
authors state that “nearly all instances” of misconduct that they
cite were in the life sciences, but if even a small percentage were
from engineering, the probabilities of males versus females com-
mitting fraud might not be significantly different. Figure 1 in the
paper by Fang et al. indicates that approximately 45% of graduate
students in the life sciences are male (and this aligns with the
percentage of male graduate students receiving NIH funding in
either individual or institutional grants) (20), while about 70% of
all science and engineering graduate students are male. Using ex-
act binomial probabilities, the 58% of male ORI cases (16% of 228
cases  36 students; 58% of 36  21 males) is significantly greater
than the percentage of female cases if males comprise 45% of the
pool (P  0.04) but not if they comprise 48% (P  0.06) or more.
Figure 1 in the paper by Fang et al. shows that approximately 61%
of life science postdoctoral students are male (somewhat more
than the 50 to 58% of NIH-funded postdoctoral students) (20)
whereas approximately 67% of all science and engineering post-
doctoral students are male. Exact binomial probabilities indicate
that the 69% of male ORI postdoctoral student cases (25% of 228
cases  57 postdoctoral students; 69% of 57  39 males) is signif-
icantly greater than the proportion of female cases if males com-
prise 50 to 58% of the pool (P  0.05) but not 61% or more.
At the faculty level, Fang et al. use as their denominator the
proportion of men and women in the scientific workforce to con-
clude that male scientists are overrepresented among ORI cases of
fraud. However, the opportunity to commit fraud may be a more
useful denominator. If we use NIH research award dollars as a
proxy for the opportunity to commit fraud in the life sciences, we
find that men have substantially more opportunity to commit
fraud than women. Compared to women, men are more likely to
hold multiple simultaneous R01 awards, lead large center grants,
and successfully compete when submitting renewals (20–22). On
average, men’s research awards are approximately $100,000 larger
(20). While these gender differences in NIH funding may lead to
fewer cases of scientific misconduct by women, they may repre-
sent another way in which gender schemas can jeopardize scien-
tific progress. Science, like fraud, is a strongly male-gendered do-
main (23) in which one would predict that peer reviewers of grant
proposals would implicitly adjust evaluative standards to require a
higher level of proof of competence from women than men.
There is no arguing with the conclusions by Fang et al. that as a
community we need to develop effective ways of ensuring that
scientific research is conducted responsibly and ethically. Scien-
tific misconduct, regardless of who commits it, diminishes all who
contribute to the scientific enterprise. We must also be wary that,
regardless of our commitment to objectivity and meritocratic
principles, gender schemas influence decision-making processes
in subtle ways that put us all at risk of contributing to the perpet-
uation of gender bias in science.
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